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Deliberative Formulation of Papua Special Autonomy Policy
RIRIS KATHARINA
Center for Research, Expertise Committee of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia
riris.katharina@dpr.go.id
Abstract. Formulation of Special Autonomy Policy (Otsus) of Papua is a unique process, since it was mandated by MPR Decree
to be carried out in a participatory manner with a strict time limit. In its development, Otsus policy has not been able to resolve
the conflict in Papua. This paper aims to analyse the formulation of Papua’s Special Autonomy policy as outlined in Law No.
21/2001 based on deliberative public policy theories. This paper uses a qualitative approach with a case study, for which indepth interviews were conducted with actors directly involved in policy discussions. The results show that the formulation of
Papua Otsus has been made without involving Papuan people participation. The Assessment Team that drafted the autonomy law
bill have failed to applied deliberative approach but a pseudo-participation. Subsequently, DPR did not provide the appropriate
deliberative rooms for the discussions of the draft law.
Keywords: deliberative policy making, policy formulation, special autonomy, Papua
Abstrak. Formulasi Kebijakan Otonomi Khusus (Otsus) Papua merupakan sebuah proses yang unik, karena pembentukanannya
diperintahkan oleh MPR untuk dilakukan secara partisipatif dengan waktu yang sangat terbatas. Dalam perkembangannya, kebijakan
Otsus Papua belum mampu mengatasi konflik di Papua. Tulisan ini bertujuan menganalisis formulasi kebijakan Otsus Papua yang
dituangkan dalam Undang-Undang Nomor 21 Tahun 2001, berdasarkan deliberative public policy. Tulisan ini menggunakan
pendekatan kualitatif, dengan wawancara secara mendalam dengan aktor yang terlibat langsung dalam pembahasan kebijakan.
Hasil penelitian memperlihatkan formulasi kebijakan Otsus Papua dibuat tanpa melibatkan partisipasi masyarakat Papua.Tim
Pengkaji yang menyusun naskah rancangan undang-undang Otsus Papua mencoba melakukan pendekatan deliberatif, namun
menghasilkan pseudo-participation. DPR tidak menyediakan ruang deliberatif dalam pembahasan rancangan undang-undang.
Kata kunci: pembuatan kebijakan deliberatif, formulasi kebijakan, otonomi khusus, Papua

INTRODUCTION
In Indonesia, the 1998 reform movement has
succeeded in encouraging state institutions to open their
space for public participation in policy formulation.
MPR, in its 2000 Annual General Assembly, has seen
the importance of changing state administration model
democratically by involving public participation. One
example of the policies is MPR Decree (TAP) No. IV of
2000 on Policy Recommendation in the Implementation
of Regional Autonomy. In the TAP, it is recommended
that the Law (UU) on Papua Otsus, as an effort to resolve
the conflict is formulated in a participatory manner
by taking into account Papuan People’s participation.
DPR, which at that time hierarchically is under MPR, is
obliged to implement these provisions.
Policy formulation involving people’s participation
is one of the prerequisites for the deliberative approach
process. The policy making, in line with Habermas’s
notion on communicative society (Hardiman, 1993),
and Dryzek (Blau, 2011: 37), who oppose the formation
of public policy by the political elites and proposes a
deliberative policy-making. With the assumption that
society has become more rational in voicing their
opinion, therefore, every individual in society must be
informed on every collective decision that to be decided,
which would show their acceptance, and they becomes

part of every decision subject (Dryzek, 2000: 11).
Dryzek also argues that the development of
deliberative democratic theory demands changes in
public policy making. Experts who are in line with
his thoughts include Peter deLeon, Danielle M. Varda,
Hajer & Wagenaar (deLeon & Varda, 2009). This idea
takes into account criteria of the democratic deliberative
process, i.e. influence, inclusion, and deliberation
Post-Suharto Indonesia, in fact, still shows
contradictory situation. As the condition of the
Indonesian people shows its dynamic, it seems that the
concept of Habermas’ communicative society meets its
relevance. The society demands sharing of information
as wide as possible on various dimensions of society,
regarding political, social, legal, or economic matters.
Post-Soeharto situation demonstrates a great desire
to make changes in Indonesia’s policy making, from
elitist to deliberative, by trying to involve people’s
participation. One of the goals of deliberative policy
making is to resolve conflicts among various interests
(Kraft & Furlong, 2013: 518). Deliberative policy
making focuses on forums that bring people with
diverse perspectives together to influence each other on
policy proposals and negotiations (Dodge, 2014: 162).
This means that the deliberative approach is best used in
conflict situations and involves many parties.
The situation of Papua from 1999 to 2000 was
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marked sharper conflict between the central government
and the people of Papua with the presence of demands
of Papua independence from the Indonesian Unitary
State or NKRI (Nainggolan, 2012: 97-98). The demands
of independence came due to various reasons, mainly,
the controversial integration of Papua into NKRI,
unfulfilled ability to achieve prosperity; marginalization
of the Papuans, and unfulfilled respect of human rights
(Elisabeth, 2005: 42-43; Widjojo, 2009: 6-7).
Conflicting actors in Papua were complex, involving
actors in central and provincial government and
parliament, pro-autonomy, pro-independence, doubters,
NGOs churches, and tribes leaders. With the large
number of actors involved, it is considered important
to hear their voices to generate trust and empathy as
a condition for conflict resolution. Without trust, each
party no longer believes what the other party says, nor
believes in the commitment and action offered (Deutsch,
2000).
The Otsus policy, which is claimed as has been
formulated deliberatively seems to be less successful
in addressing the conflict in Papua (Nainggolan, 2012:
305-309). This is shown by the still sounding demands of
independence consistently stated by United Liberation
Movement for West Papua (ULMWP), a unification
of Federal State of West Papua (NRFPB), West Papua
National Coalition for Liberation (WPNCL), and
National Parliament of West Papua (PNWP).
On 12 August 2005, the Papuan Traditional Council
(DAP) gave instructions to the existing Customary
Council to return Otsus to the Papuan Regional
Representative Council (DPRD). This decision was
part of the follow up of the third Indigenous Council
Assembly in Manokwari on 31 January-4 February
2005, which gave a time limit for the realization of
Otsus until 15 August 2005. If by that date there was
no significant change in Papua, then Otsus would be
returned.
Further, Papuan People’s
Assembly (MRP)
deliberations with Papuan indigenous people, which
were represented by 7 major tribes on 9-10 June 2010
concluded that Law No. 21/2001 on Special Autonomy
for Papua Province for 9 years has failed. Therefore, they
have issued 11 points of recommendation, among others,
demanded a referendum towards Papua’s independence
as a separate state from the NKRI; sending back the
Special Autonomy Law to the central government; and
demanding a further discussion mediated by a neutral
international party.
The reasons for sending back Otsus varied. First,
Otsus was granted by the central government, not as a
result of negotiations between the people of Papua and
the central government (Nainggolan, 2012: 304-305).
Second, Otsus is not implemented seriously. Third,
Otsus is like a toothless tiger, stagnant, because there are
no provincial regulations (Perdasi) and special regional
regulations (Perdasus) (Elisabeth, 2005).
Other researches said that the implementation of the
Papua autonomy policy is still problematic. Musa’ad
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(2011) indicated that the implementation of the policy
has not been able to be effectively implemented.
Directorate General of Regional Autonomy (2014)
in its evaluation concluded that the acceleration of
development to improve the welfare of the people has
not been achieved.
Unlike the results of research conducted by O’Flynn,
Dryzek, and Fishkin which proves the successful
use of a deliberative approach in resolving national
identity conflicts (He, 2010: 709-739), the conflict
in Papua continues until present day because of its
inconsistent implementation.This means that what has
been practiced in Papua for the time-being is merely
a pseudo-deliberation.The great desire to present the
deliberative process of policy formulation to stop the
conflict in Papua has not shown satisfactory results.
This study aims to analyze deliberative policy-making
practiced by DPR in the case of Otsus Papua.
RESEARCH METHOD
This research uses a qualitative approach, which is
chosen to be able to reveal all deliberative practices
conducted since the emergence of the idea of Otsus
Papua in MPR until it was decided to become a national
policy by DPR and the government in the form of
Law. Series of work starts from determining the case
to be studied. Problems were identified from literature
studies, applying relevant theories and both published
and unpublished research results, in addition to obtained
information from mass- and online media. Next, the core
stage of the research is conducting with data excavation
directly, through in-depth interview techniques with
various sources.
The sources consisted of the Pansus (Special
Committee) Chairperson of the Bill on Otsus Papua,
Sabam Sirait; Papuan Special Committee member,
Simon Patrice Morin; Special Committee Member
of PDI-P, Tumbu Saraswati; DPR expert, Nicolas
Simanjuntak; former Director General of PUOD,
Sudarsono, and expert staff of the Minister of Home
Affairs, Sodjuangan Situmorang. These were the parties
directly involved in the deliberation process of the
Papuan Autonomy Bill in DPR.
The research sources covered also native Papuan,
who are scholars from the University of Cenderawasih.
i.e. Mohammad Musa’ad; religious figure, Karl Philip
Erari; and leader of NGO FOKER, Abner. Other sources
involved were figures representing the Papuan Presidium
or the pro-independence group, Thaha Al-Hamid,
church communities, Rev. Sofyan Yoman Socrates; and
scholars, Neles Tebay.
Data is also obtained from literature studies, the
results of previous research, reports of the preparation
of the law, as well as various regulations and expert
opinions. The final stage is conducted by analyzing data
and writing reports. The findings in the field are arranged
according to categories prepared based on theory and
references. Furthermore, data and information obtained
are analyzed based on the theory used. Next, the
conclusions are drawn.
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RESULT AND DISCUSSION
The Otsus policy arose from the completion of the
problem resolution in Irian Jaya based on the TAP
MPR No. IV/1999 on the Guidelines of the State Policy
(GBHN) of 1999-2004. It was mentioned there that the
MPR will keep the NKRI while respecting diversity of
social and cultural life of the Irian Jaya people, through
the establishment of special autonomous regions
regulated by law. The MPR will also resolve cases of
human rights violations in the province through an
honest and dignified court process.
The order was resulted by the conditions as one
hundred Papuan figures were invited by President B.J
Habibie to the National Palace on 26 February 1999 to
discuss the situation in Papua which was increasingly
volatile. The dialogue that was originally expected
to run smoothly found disappointment when they
demanded President Habibie to gave independence for
Papua (Widjojo, 2009: 157). President Habibie, however,
suggested that they returned and contemplated the
request.
Habibie’s attitude led to the disappointment of the
one hundred Papuan figures. They then held the Second
Papuan People’s Congress in Jayapura in May-June
2000 as well as forming a Papuan Presidium or PDP
(Chauvel & Bhakti, 2004: 27). PDP became new elite
in Papua supporting the independence movement for
Papua.
The solution to resolve the conflict in Papua through
Otsus solution comes from the Papuan elites in MPR.
Its proposal was prepared quickly and very hastily, on
the grounds that the situation in Irian Jaya was very
apprehensive, and very urgent to be resolved. Some
Papuan figures in MPR, such as Simon Patrice Morin
and Jaap Solossa, both from Golkar played an important
role in the entry of the provisions concerning Otsus into
TAP MPR (Solossa, 2005: 26).
They garnered support from other MPR members
from Papua, among others, by Ruben Gobay, Alex
Hesegem, Lukas Karl Degey, Lukas Sabarofak,
Marthina Mehue Wally, and Sulaeman L. Hamzah.
Other members of the Golkar Faction, such as Ariady
Achmad, Rambe Kamarulzaman, Ruben Gobay, and
S.M. Tampubolon alternately voiced that for Irian Jaya
to be given attention.
From the minutes of the discussions of TAP MPRNo.
IV/1999 on GBHN, it is known that the proposed grant
of Otsus status for Irian Jaya is not from Commission
A discussing the draft provisions on GBHN, but
derived from Commission B which discusses the draft
provisions on non-GBHN material. In fact, the material
on Otsus Irian Jaya is included in the TAP MPR about
GBHN.
The Otsus solution was offered because MPR
members from Aceh also proposed the same thing,
namely Otsus for Aceh. In order for the echo to sound
stronger, MPR members of Papua from Golkar, offered
themselves to MPR members from Aceh to fight for the
Aceh and Irian Jaya issues together. This proposal was
responded well.
The minutes mentioned that MPR members
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from Irian Jaya offered a concept to Commission B
containing 4 main points to be included as a draft TAP
MPR, namely on human rights violations; development
that has not touched the local people; indigenous
Papuan who deprived from their traditional rights and
cultural distinctives; development which was designed
from the center, never considered the varying degrees
of advancement ranging from koteka era society groups
to relatively advanced ones.
These facts have been delivered by 100
representatives of Irian Jaya people directly to President
Habibie on 26 February 1999 at the National Palace,
and they requested that a peaceful secession be given
as a means of ending the suffering. In response to the
request, MPR members from Irian Jaya proposed that
region be granted Special Autonomy as the best solution
to allow the local government and Irian Jaya people to
establish themselves in accordance with their particular
cultural and special conditions.
Following the enactment of an order to grant Otsus
to Papua in the TAP MPR in 1999, Papua Special
Autonomy Law has not been drafted by either the
government or DPR. Responding to that, in its Annual
General Assembly on 7-18 August, 2000, MPR
reminded President Gus Dur to give serious attention
and be firm against all forms of separatist movements
that threaten NKRI and accelerate the implementation
of Otsus in the province.
Reflecting that until end of 2000, the Special
Autonomy Law was not yet formed for Irian Jaya, in its
Annual General Assembly, MPR decided to impose time
limit on the formation of the Special Autonomy Law,
which was no later than 1 May 2001. Constitutionally,
the MPR recommendation should be responded by DPR
because since the First Amendments in 2000, the power
to form a law according to Article 20 is in its hands, not
the President. The reason for the not-drafting of the Bill
by DPR was because DPR was given a number of Bills
that must be passed immediately, which all are “the
orders” of the International Monetary Fund.
The government, on the contrary, responded to the
TAP MPR by immediately drafting the Bill on Special
District Government in Irian Jaya and submitted it to
DPR. The Bill was signed by President Gus Dur on
14 March 2001 and read in DPR Plenary meeting on
20 March 2001. At DPR Bamus (Steering Committee)
Meeting on 28 March 2001, it was agreed that the Bill
from the government would be scheduled to enter the
Stage I Talks on 1 May 2001.
However, not long after, at the Plenary Meeting on
25 April 2001, it was announced that there was the Bill
on Special Autonomy for the Irian Jaya Province in the
form of Self-Governing Territories from Governor and
DPRD received by DPR. This is an unprecedented event,
where the Bill comes from parties outside DPR and the
President. To be able to accommodate the Bill version
of the Irian Jaya government, in the Plenary Meeting of
3 May 2001, it was announced about the acceptance of
a proposal from 60 (sixty) members of DPR, namely the
Proposed Initiative Bill on Special Autonomy for Papua
Province in the Form of Self-Governing Territory.
How the Governor and Provincial DPRD of Irian
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Jaya could draft the Papua Special Autonomy Bill can
be explained as follows. Irian Jaya Governor at that time,
Jaap Solossa (23 November 2000-23 November 2005December 19, 2005), which at the time TAP MPRNo.
IV/1999 and 2000 was established, is a member of MPR,
took the initiative to draft the Bill. He argued that the
people that understood Papua were Papuans themselves.
Therefore, it was fitting for the Papuan people to draft
the Papuan Otsus Bill. Jaap Solossa’s opinion is evident
when he saw the draft of the government version of the
Bill submitted to DPR, many of which are inconsistent
with the draft law drafted by the Provincial Government
of Papua. Examples may include the lack of specificity
from the political side, such as presenting MRP and the
specificity in the drafting of local regulations, both in
provincial (Perdasi) and special regulations (Perdasus).
According to Sudarsono, the difference on the nongovernment’s version of the draft was only political
legislation --liberately made in high call (high demands)
to be able to reach a deal in the middle.
At the time Solossa wanted to draft the Bill, the
condition in Papua has already lost their trust towards
the central government, even the regional government
and Provincial DPRD. In fact, the Special Committee
formed by the Provincial DPRD to draft the Bill on
Otsus Papua cannot perform its duty. People only believe
in religious and cultural leaders. In late December 2000,
Jaap Solossa opened discussions with prominent Papuan
figures, such as Speaker of the Provincial DPRD,
Nathaniel Kaiway, Rector of Cendrawasih University,
Frans Wospakrik, State Minister for the Acceleration of
Development of East Indonesia, Manuel Kaisiepo, and
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other native Papuan politicians, intellectuals and church
leaders.
Based on this talk, Jaap Solossa finally took the
initiative to form an integrated team based on the
Governor’s Decree, to start and draft the Bill by
accommodating the thoughts of the Papuan people. The
team is called the Assessment Team. The Chairperson
of the Team stated before the DPR Special Committee
that his Team is only a small part of all Papuans who
were trusted by the local government and society to
help accommodate their aspirations and then formulate
it into the Bill. Therefore, the Team was expected to be
able to bridge between the national interests to guard
the Republic of Indonesia through the formulation of
Otsus and the distrust of the Papuan people towards the
policy makers, at the central and in the region.
In relation to the involvement of local government,
the Assessment Team stated that the local government
in this process only acts as a facilitator without being
directly involved in the process of collecting people’s
aspirations. It is intended that the Papuan people are
given the opportunity to express their aspirations
openly without fear by the local government (Secretariat
General of DPR, 2002: 1.310). However, the fact shows
that one of the members of the Team is also a member
of the Provincial DPRD Irian Jaya (H. Wanggomer).
Yusak Andato even told that local government officials
are always present and active in every activity in the
process of discussion of the Bill. Furthermore, the
Assessment Team performs its work with the activity
stage as illustrated in Figure 1.
At the beginning of the work, the Assessment Team

Figure 1. Working Stages of the Papua Autonomy Assessment Team
Source: Sumule (2003:358).

undertook the collection of materials to be used in the
initial draft of the Bill. According to the report of the
Team, the materials are derived from the raw concept
compiled by the Provincial Government of Irian
Jaya and DPRD, FOKER, the Papua Work Forum
from Cendrawasih University, Papua University in
Manokwari, and the results of the Second Papuan
Congress attended by PDP, religious groups, and
intellectual figures (Secretariat General of DPR, 2002).
The FOKER staff interviewed stated that there was
indeed a draft Otsus Bill drafted by them, but not

accommodated in the draft version of the Team.
The church figure, Socrates, stated that there is no
concept of Otsus organized by the church. Thaha AlHamid from PDP even stated that since the beginning
the PDP has never agreed with Otsus, so there is no
concept of Otsus owned by PDP. There is an impression
that the Team is pressed by time, resulting the process
of involving the people in drafting the Bill was not
maximally implemented. From the beginning, Theo
van der Brock, a pastor in Papua, has stressed the
importance of providing enough time for people to
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consider the idea of Otsus.
After the initial concept has been formulated, the
Assessment Team then prepared the speech of the
Governor of Papua. The content of the speech stirred
the people in Papua to understand what the mandate
TAP MPR is. The Team also prepared a document
on the rights and obligations of the Papuan people.
Furthermore, the Team went to all districts and cities
in Irian Jaya Province to capture the aspirations of all
components of the community (local government,
DPRP, cultural and religious institutions, women
and youth groups), and from those whose aspirations
are independent and rejected Otsus, e.g. groups of
scholars. The Team claimed to have involved parties
who wanted independence and did not want Otsus in
every discussions of the Bill. Sumule recounted that
it was originally designed for the people to participate
by providing input to the draft Bill. However, it was
decided that instead of waiting for people to include
their suggestions, a number of small teams were formed
and sent to every district capital (Sumule, 2003: 26).
From the aspiration screening activity, academic
paper was formulated and subsequently developed into
the main ideas. The next stage is drafting the Bill. The
draft Bill was discussed with various circles in the cities
of Jayapura and Jakarta. In Jakarta, the Assistance
Team reported that they involved members of DPR from
Papua’s electoral districts as well as Papuan students
and communities outside Irian Jaya were involved in
several meetings in Jakarta. During the drafting of
the Bill and the main points, the Team also conducted
activities, among others, invited various experts and
professional associations, and met with the leaders of 10
factions in DPR.
Following the initial draft, a Special Autonomy Bill
Review Forum was held on 27-29 March 2001. August
Kafiar described the atmosphere at the opening of the
review forum in Jayapura on 27 March 2001 through
a video showing played in DPR Special Committee
meeting. The description of the situation of opening the
study forum, is as follows;
“... after it was inaugurated by the Governor, Barnabas
Suebu as a representative of our Team will deliver the
exposure on what is meant by special autonomy. When
the Chairperson of the Assembly, Simon Patrice Morin,
has not started yet again to present the content of the Bill,
the people, all delegates from all districts, spontaneously
came forward screaming and thwarting. Later, Simon
Patrice Morin as has been seen on the full showing
screamed and his voice is lost amidst the screams of
people who do not want any special autonomy. Finally,
it almost failed to be suspended and we had to do a
hard lobbying. And then some would want to start on
the afternoon and would like to continue the next day
understand what is meant by some, but some districts is
not willing and did not attend.”(Secretariat General of
DPR, 2001: 145)
This activity is claimed by the Assessment Team to
be attended by all components of the region because
the participants are representatives of all components
that exist throughout Irian, including from the Papuan
Presidium Council (PDP), which lead the Papuan
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Congress. However, this claim was denied by former
Chairperson of BEM Cendrawasih University Yusak
Andato, Socrates (from the church), and Thaha Al-Hamid
(PDP). Indeed, the Papuan Traditional Council (DAP),
as one of the most representative Papuan societies, has
never felt acceptance towards Otsus (Elisabeth, 2005:
122). In a meeting in Manokwari District, it was read by
the Manokwari District Council of Papuans that: firstly,
they rejected all forms of autonomy determined by the
other party. Second, Otsus can be discussed as long as
the idea of “I” is also discussed. They further demanded
that the discussion on Otsus be stopped. Some of the
audience also demanded the same thing. The situation
turned into a mess, however, the discussion continues.
The people, according to Sumule, are still willing to
accept and read the documents distributed (Sumule,
2003: 26).
According to Socrates (interviewed on 1 February
2016), most Papuans at that time disagreed Otsus.
However, there are some who hope that what is
promised in the Otsus draft, which is to build Papua,
be materialized. Thaha (interviewed on 12 March 2016)
recounted that the Assessment Team went to the PDP
leaders in prison to inquire about Otsus. However,
Theys said that they disagreed with it. Although they
did not support Otsus, the PDP did not forbid the Team
to draft the Special Autonomy Bill. Father Neles Tebay
(interviewed on 14 June 2016) revealed that as the law
was drafted the pro-independence group voices has
never been heard.
Nevertheless, the Head of the Assessment Team
stated that the Special Autonomy Bill was the proposal
of Papua People. It was said so because the people’s
opinions were heard by the Assessment Team. They also
claimed that public participation is also made against
the pro-independence. The absorption of the aspirations
of the pro-independence was repeatedly submitted by
August Kafiar in hearing at DPR Special Committee.
He said “... there is a red line between the initial context
we prepared, and we accommodate all aspirations
including those who want to be independent...”
In spite of the fact that for the Indonesian Government
the history of the entry of West Irian (Papua) to
Indonesia has been completed with the result of the
Popular Acceptance (Pepera) passed in the UN General
Assembly through Resolution No. 25-4 on 19 November
1969 (Directorate of International Organization, 1998:
1). Nevertheless, there are still parties who have not
been able to accept the results of the Pepera because
it assesses that there has been a deviation in the
implementation.
In the perspective of deliberative policy, the policymaking process undertaken by the Assessment Team
is a pseudo-deliberative process because it has decided
on a policy formulation in the form of a draft Bill prior
to reaching agreement from all parties to the conflict.
This is marked by the wide open deliberation of the
deliberation room by the Team by inviting all elements of
the people in the discussion forums held in the districts.
However, when the anti-Otsus refuses to discuss it, their
absence is not at issue, with reasons that their opinions
are being accommodated.
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Importantly, the deliberation process requires the
presence of a different voice to be heard and discussed
together to find a solution that is mutually agreed
(Saward, 2000: 66-67). In an interview with Simon
Patrice Morin (interview dated 27 June 2016), he did
not argue that not all parties were involved in discussing
Otsus. He stated that it was difficult at that time to ask
the opinion of all parties. A similar statement was
expressed by Tumbu Saraswati, a member of the Special
Committee from the PDI-P (Interviewed on 20 October
2016).
Based on input from the Review Forum, the draft
of the Bill was revised to the 14th draft in April 2001
under the tittle Bill on Special Autonomy for Papua
Province in the Form of Self-Governing Territory. The
14th Draft consists of 23 Chapters and 76 Articles. The
draft was submitted by the Governor of Irian Jaya to the
DPRD I and DPRD II, issued it as a regional product
through Presidential Decree No. 3/PIM-DPRD/2001.
The draft was conveyed by the Governor of Irian Jaya
to the central government (President Gus Dur, Vice
President Megawati Soekarnoputri, DPR speaker, and
Coordinating Minister for Politic, Social, and Security)
on 16 April 2001.
After the draft of the Bill was submitted to DPR,
the Assessment Team remained in Jakarta. During the
two months since the submission of the draft to DPR,
the Assessment Team saw no reaction from the central
government to immediately deliberate the discussions
of the Bill. No immediate response to the Bill had
caused disappointment for the Team. They were worried
that people would not believe in academics either.
Eventhough, during the discussion process of Otsus in
Papua, the Team assessed that the people could accept
them as a communication bridge between the people
and the government.
When finally DPR scheduled the discussions of
the Bill, the Team requested that they could be made
as an Assistance Team during the discussions which
took place in DPR. The request was received by DPR
Special Committee, so the Team was formally invited to
Special Committee DPR to present the draft of the Bill.
The Team also developed an improvement alternative as
material when needed by DPR Special Committee, and
further helped prepare the required Problem Inventory
List (DIM)
The Bill on Special Autonomy for Papua Province in
the form of Self-Governing Area, which was submitted
by the Provincial Government of Papua to DPR, did
not necessarily become DPR Initiative Bill. In the
process of making the Bill to become DPR Proposal,
DPR met obstacles because there were provisions that
must be obeyed. Article 125 of the 1999 DPR Rules of
Procedure stipulates that at least 10 members of DPR
should submit DPR Initiative Bill.
On 15 April 2001, 70 DPR members submitted an
initiative Bill to DPR Speaker with two different titles.
A total of 45 members submitted the Bill on Special
Autonomy for Papua Province in the form of SelfGoverning Territories, and 25 members submitted a Bill
on Special Autonomy for Papua Province. Both drafts
of the Bills were actually the same payload, but given a
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different title. One of the proposed Bill was actually a
Bill drafted by the Assessment Team.
Earlier, on 14 March 2001, the President has
submitted a draft Bill on the Regional Government in
Irian Jaya to DPR. According to Article 114 Paragraph
(1) of DPR Rules of Procedure, if there are 2 drafts of
Bills on the same matter, the draft which was previously
accepted will be discussed, while the later draft is then
used as a complement. This means that the government
version of the Bill should be discussed, while DPR Bill
is being complementary.
In view of the TAP MPR mandated for the
establishment of the Papua Special Autonomy Law
with respect to the aspirations of the Papuan people,
DPR considered the Papuan version of the draft Bill
proposed by a Team from Papua to be more worthy to
be discussed over the draft version of the government
Bill. In the Consultation Meeting between DPR,
Menkopolsoskam and Mendagri held on 13 July 2001,
several agreements were made: The government and
DPR agreed to immediately follow up the mandate of
MPR Decree No. IV/MPR/1999 on GBHN by realizing
the Law on Otsus for Irian Jaya; they agreed that the
Law on Otsus for Irian Jaya would be realized through
DPR Initiative Proposal, by making the draft Bill
coming from the Irian Jaya people as the main reference,
while the draft Bill coming from the government as
a comparison; the discussions of the Bill have been
agreed upon by DPR Special Committee, which would
be formed after 4th Trial Session; to assign Special
Committee to immediately and intensively discuss
the Special Autonomy Bill for Irian Jaya including the
Special Autonomy Bill for Aceh
Overall, it can be said that the process of requesting
government approval to use DPR draft went through a
long process. It is recorded for 5 times meeting and 3
times Consultation Meeting until finally the government
with their wisdom can understand DPR desire to use
the draft Bill originating from the Team which has been
proposed by the governor and both DPRD of Irian Jaya.
In the Steering Commmitee Meeting on July 16,
2001, it was agreed that the discussions of the Bill
would be conducted through a short procedure, which
was handled by a Special Committee consisting 50 DPR
members. The short procedure is chosen given the time
limit which is approaching. With a short procedure,
Bill discussions are without going through 4 stages of
talks, whereas, after the first stage talks in the plenary,
the third stage talks are held in a special committee to
discuss the detailed substance of the Bill.
Unfortunately, Otsus itself is interpreted differently
by the Assistance Team. Some view Otsus as a joint
effort to build a solid, robust platform for dialogue.
However, there are those who said that Otsus is a dowry
that must be paid by the government to keep in NKRI.
From the statement of one of the IAGI in the 5th
hearing of 26 September 2001, it was disclosed that
the Assistance Team had invited IAGI in the Team
meeting held in May and June 2001. A statement from
the Special Committee Chairperson reaffirmed that the
IAGI is close to the Assistance Team. “... I think because
you are close to the Assistance Team, I suspect that you
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have accepted (the draft of the Bill).”
In accordance with the established agenda, the Stage
1 discussions were held in the Plenary meeting on 27
September 2001, attended by 357 of the 483 members of
DPR and the government represented by Minister Hari
Sabarno. The Special Committee chairperson, Sabam
Sirait (PDI-P) explained the content of the Bill. In the
Stage 3 discussions, the working meeting (Raker) was
held for six times and the working committee meeting
(Panja) for 8 times.
In this Panja, the actors involved in the discussions
of the Bill were members of DPR Panja and officials
from the government. In the process of deliberating
the Bill, several lobbying took place. The important
one was the first lobbying was on 4 and 5 October
2001, which discussed the title of the Bill. Its result
informed that the government accepted DPR proposal
since it was assumed that the proposal represented a
public aspiration, and has been further viewed from
the sociological and historical aspects. At the end of
the Special Committee review process, the government
requested a suspension to lobby, among other, on the
new placement of Indonesian Armed Forces relocation.
The materials discussed in Panja included the MRP,
regional symbols, protection of indigenous peoples’
rights, human rights, the Commission on Reconciliation,
political parties, police, judicial and prosecutorial
powers, economy, finance, social, education, health,
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environment and sustainability, monitoring and
switchover conditions.
After the completion of the discussions of the Bill is
finished at the Stage 3, they proceed to Stage 4, namely
decision-making, which took place on 22 October 2001.
It attended by Minister Hari Sabarno and 370 people
from 483 DPR members. In his report, Chairperson
Sirait conveyed that Papua was now entering the new
era and underlined that various misconducts towards
the development that occurred in the past must be
eradicated to the roots.
All factions approved the Bill on Special Autonomy
for Papua Province as Law; they gave their approval by
way of consensus. The government in its final remarks
acknowledged that the drafting process was not a
simple thing, especially in articulating and aggregating
the interests of the Papuan, because it must be combined
with the national interests as a whole.
Judging from the actors who played a role in the
issuance of Otsus policy as a solution problem in Papua,
since the stage in the MPR to DPR, the process showed
that the elites performed an important role. The birth
of the policy took place in a short time, and without
the presence of forum listening to the voice of the OAP
(indigenous Papuans). In DPR, the role of OAP was
replaced by the Assessment Team. (see Figure 2).
Based on the deliberative forum typology proposed

Figure 2. Actors in Otsus Papua Policy Formulation
Source: modified from DPR minutes, 2001, and interviews with informants.

by Saward (2000), deliberative forums conducted
within DPR are Type A, which can be identified
as Representative-Formal Type. This means, the
deliberative forums in DPR were conducted in a
representative manner and were implemented formally.
In fact, it was only attended by the Assessment Team
considered to be a representation of indigenous Papuans,
as actors who feel unfairly treated by the government,
miserable and violated its human rights. The Team was
actually a facilitator assigned by the Governor of Papua,
not DPR which has the power to form Law.
Judging from the criteria for the democratic
deliberative process in policy making, there are
3 things that must be considered in absorbing the
people aspirations, namely influence; inclusion and
deliberation. First, influence, did the process have the
ability to influence policy and its decision-making?
DPR has invited related parties to hearing process, but

none of them involved indigenous Papuans; voters who
disagree with Otsus were ignored.
Regarding the influence process took place between
DPR and actors invited to the hearing, in FOKER’s
view, the Assessment Team, the provincial government
and the Papuans invited to DPR were pro-Otsus actors.
Therefore, in the criterion of influence, there is no
influence-influencing process in the hearing forum and
visit, since the actors’ interests were the same.
Second, inclusion. Did in the process, representative
Papuan include different points of view and values,
providing equal opportunity for each to participate? In
fact, DPR has given wide space to the Assessment Team
to discuss and fill an open check to make decisions. It
seemed that DPR has trusted the information submitted
by the Team, that the drafting process in Papua has been
conducted in a participatory manner, involving various
parties, including the pro-independence. The PDP
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denied it; they said that they had been visited by the
Team in prison for questioning their opinion of Otsus.
Because their choice is independence, however, they
never again talked to.
Third, deliberation. Did the process provide open
dialogue, access to information, respect, space to
understand and create new frameworks on issues, and
moves toward consensus? In the Special Committee,
in fact, it was not possible to discuss the point of view
of the parties who are calling for alternative solutions
to problems in Papua. Independent parties were not
involved because of their aspiration for the separation
of Papua came into the spotlight politicians in Jakarta.
Therefore, the dialogue only took place between DPR
and the Assessment Team who drafted the Bill, and the
deliberation process only occured in one option, namely
the Otsus.
Initial consultation activities were undertaken by
DPR by inviting the Assessment Team to give exposure
to the draft Bill they made. In its presentation, the actors
identified by the Team were only two, namely the proOtsus and the pro-Independence. In fact, LIPI identified
three actors, which were the Otsus supporters (very red);
the independence supporters (very blue); and doubtful
parties (pink, light blue, or red blue). The failure of the
Team to identify complete actors caused in the difficulty
of establishing commitments in policy implementation
as Cohen suggests (Saward 2000: 66-67).
DPR was impressed by the claims of the Assessment
Team that it was a neutral Team, acceptable to
pro-autonomous and pro-independence, and had
undertaken activities to explore the participation of the
Papuan people. However, from the statement of Rev.
Yoman Socrates, Thaha Al-Hamid, and FOKER, it is
doubted that the Team can be regarded as a neutral and
appropriate one to engage in people aspirations. The
Team only brought the concept of Otsus, therefore, it is
just an idea of Jakarta.
The Assessment Team continued to work on the
completion of the Bill, even if the vote that rejected
Otsus continued to be heard. The claims of the Team,
stating that the vote of the pro-independence has been
accommodated through several provisions contained
in the Law, such as the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission and the alignment of history was not the
same as the concept of the pro-independence. In the
view of the drafter of the Law, Situmorang, historical
alignment material was included in the Law as a healing
process, taking lesson from South Africa experience
in making reconciliation, rather than leading to
independence. Meanwhile, according to the proindependence, the alignment of history was intended to
sue the results of the Pepera conducted in 1969.
The review forum organized by the Assistance Team,
in fact, cannot make all participants, either pro-Otsus or
pro-Independence or Doubts, to influence each other as
Dryzek (2000) argues. The pro-independence even left
the forum area with anger. It was said that the will of the
pro-independence to the solution of the Papua problem
of historical alignment was accommodated in the draft
compiled by the Team. However, the draft was never
discussed openly with the parties who expressed it in
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consultation forums.
In the visit conducted by DPR to absorb the aspirations
of the Papuans, Tumbu Saraswati recounted the viewing
of the condition where the pro-independence was angry
and left the meeting room. “It is difficult to invite the
pro-independence to sit together to discuss Papua
future because they want independence”. According
to Dryzek, precisely in this situation, a deliberative
approach is needed because informal communications
can take place over time, through public networks and
policy dialogue, so this can further give each participant
an opportunity to influence each other (He, 2010: 710).
The practice of pseudo-participation in the Papua
case aroused because there was time limit issue that
had been set by TAP MPR, making policy makers
paid less attention to deliberative principles in policy
formation. The practice was reinforced in the hearing
process to capture input from experts and professional
associations. Thus, the forum showed duplicated
activities, which would not get a different view of what
the Team has stated. Simultaneously, DPR made the
hearing as a sideline activity, provided stakeholders no
material to be discussed.
The visit conducted by DPR to Papua mostly involved
the elites in local government. Whereas, the visit should
be used to approach the problem in real terms by looking
at the condition and the voice of the local people,
especially the informal actors whose voices are often
poorly heard. Obviously, the reality on the field reflected
something else: when those who wanted independence
as solution voiced their opinion, activities were stopped;
and those who scream independence were driven out of
the meeting room. Thus, there was no room for other
Papuans to be heard. This condition has resulted in noncommitment in Papuans, particularly those who wanted
independence or who were still in doubt with Otsus.
Rooms for raising Papuan problem depended only on
the pro-Otsus parties because the time limit of 1 May
2001 needed to be adhered.The central government
has moreover a bitter experience with Timor-Leste,
with which since August 2001 had officially split from
Indonesia. These situations lead to fear of Papua would
also be separated from NKRI. Therefore, Sirait stressed
that Papua could ask for anything but did not ask to be
separated from NKRI. There was also pressure from
the international world to immediately address Papua
issue (Elisabeth, 2005).
CONCLUSION
Law No. 21/2001 on Special Autonomy for Papua
Province is one of the policies generated by DPR of
1999-2004. The rejection and failure implementation
of the Otsus afterwards reminded us the importance
to adopt the concept of deliberative public policy. The
problems faced by Papua in addition to the imbalance
of welfare and injustice is the number of cases of
human rights violations that have not been settled and
dissatisfaction over the results of the Pepera. This is the
problem that continues to be voiced by those who want
Papua Independence.
In the formulation stage, the policy-making process
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that left behind the pro-independence actors on the
grounds of a narrow time since it was difficult to
negotiate with them for Otsus caused in the presence of
less than perfect participation practices. Representation
is done by capturing the idea, but ignoring the process
of presenting various actors to hear their voices.
The timing of the deliberations of a restrictive policy
ultimately results in a pseudo-deliberative, by making
deals based on political interests alone. Pseudodeliberative has resulted in a policy’s loss of force for
lack of mutual commitment. This research finds that
the drafting of Otsus policy in conflict situations still
requires public participation.
The Bill formulation by a third party, the
Papua Provincial Government and DPRD, was an
unprecedented event at that time. This initiative was
considered unique since almost all of the draft bills came
from the government. DPR’s view that the draft Bill
originating from Papua was considered to represent the
will of the Papuan people was, however, a mistake in the
perspective of deliberative policy-making. Therefore,
the process of public involvement in the discussions of
the Bill runs in pseudo.
Less than perfect participation has resulted in a lack
of support in the form of commitments from all parties.
This was evident from the withdrawal of the central
government in the commitment to implement the
law, as evidenced by the delay in issuing government
regulations for the implementation the Law and creating
new rules that Perdasi and Perdasus can be prepared.
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